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Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994

Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations: standardized access control

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

At its sixtieth session, the General Assembly decided to defer to its sixty-first session consideration of standardized access control, as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 24 February 2006 (A/60/695) considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report of 7 March 2006 (A/60/7/Add.35). The present report is submitted to further elaborate on standardized access control measures as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General and to provide the detailed information requested by the Advisory Committee in its report. It also describes the proposed scope, concept and revised course of action for standardized access control at all main locations of the Organization, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/294. Furthermore, as requested by the Assembly in paragraph 44 of section XI of its resolution 59/276, it recalls the estimated costs as proposed in the report of the Secretary-General for addressing critical requirements that should be implemented

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without delay. The additional improvements identified will bring all main duty stations into compliance with the headquarters minimum operating security standards for perimeter protection and electronic access control. The report sets a new timetable for a detailed plan for implementation of the project.

I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to paragraph 44 of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276, the Secretary-General submitted his report of 24 February 2006 (A/60/695), in which he outlined the proposed scope, concept and revised course of action for standardized access control at all main locations of the Organization. The Secretary-General has proposed that the implementation of the standardized access control project be undertaken in two phases. The first phase of standardized access control is intended to meet compliance with headquarters minimum operating security standards for perimeter protection and electronic access control. The second phase is designed to provide for compliance with those standards with regard to defined layers of security within the perimeter. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that a second report would be submitted to the Assembly at its sixty-first session, containing a detailed plan and estimated resource requirements. In its decision 60/551 B, the General Assembly decided to defer to its sixty-first session consideration of the standardized access control project proposed in the report of the Secretary-General. In line with that decision and as requested by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report of 7 March 2006 (A/60/7/Add.35), the present report of the Secretary-General provides additional information on the first phase of the project. The second phase will be presented to the Assembly at its sixty-second session.

2. During 2005, the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, through a team of experts, undertook a comprehensive assessment of the security position at each of the eight main locations of the Secretariat and at the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The expert team consulted information technology and facility management experts as well as security personnel at each location in the course of the comprehensive assessment. Those visits were the first opportunity for the Department to augment earlier reports with a comprehensive on-site survey of all the locations.

3. The experts noted that substantial security improvements had been made in the context of a large number of ongoing projects aimed at strengthening security and safety over the past two years. No redundant or overly elaborate projects in excess of requirements, as determined by local conditions, were identified by the experts. However, the team noted some delays in project implementation, as well as shortfalls at certain locations in connection with security coverage or in the technical parameters of particular barriers, perimeter surveillance or other access control measures. The team attributed those shortcomings in part to insufficient security capacity owing to a lack of project management caused by a delay in recruitment against authorized security posts at the Professional level. The expert team also identified specific instances at some locations where technical measures, either in place or planned, required upgrading or adjustment.

4. In its findings, the team of experts proposed that the various sets of minimum operating security standards currently in use, including the headquarters minimum

operating security standards, be consolidated by the Department of Safety and Security into a single set of operational instructions that would incorporate additional details, while adding flexibility by setting out mandatory as well as recommended requirements. This is now under way. Through the project access control team, the Department would provide local managers with technical advice on a case-by-case basis and propose appropriate security standards to them, thereby avoiding unnecessary delays in the implementation of projects already under way. A time frame of six to eight months was proposed by the team for procurement and preliminary design. The project bid and construction phase was estimated to require 18 to 24 months. Full project duration from procurement to commissioning and acceptance was estimated at 24 to 30 months from the time of approval by the General Assembly.

5. On the basis of the findings of the expert team, the Secretary-General proposed to defer implementation of the global identity management component as described in paragraph 26 of his report of 30 September 2004 (A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1), pending more detailed analysis of requirements and a feasibility study as to the cost benefits and operational value of that approach. The assessment would be made once the essential features of a standard access control system were in place.

II. Overview of existing access control capability

6. In his report of 5 April 2004 on strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises (A/58/756), the Secretary-General outlined plans for security improvements to facility infrastructure, which included such projects as reinforcement of fences, traffic control barriers, security control centres, vehicle identification, remote closing and locking devices and the installation of blast-proof lamination on glass surfaces. Each of these projects has significantly improved the safety and security of the United Nations premises and each of the projects is consistent with the headquarters minimum operating security standards requirements and risk assessments. The projects reported on in annex II of the report of the Advisory Committee of 28 October 2004 (A/59/539) are still in various stages of implementation, with completion dates established for the present biennium.

7. The first phase of the proposed standardized access control project will provide for additional requirements for headquarters minimum operating security standards access control compliance with regard to the physical security of the perimeter. The second phase of the project, once approved by the General Assembly, will achieve full compliance with the headquarters minimum standards as regards access control by integrating the layers of security internal to the perimeter into the overall access control system. The first phase contains access control-related projects for the purpose of enhancing security capability. The standardized access control proposal for New York-based annex buildings and offices away from Headquarters is intended to resolve systematically the remaining weaknesses, which include deficiencies in coverage of access control, card readers and monitoring points; deficiencies in integration among systems such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), intrusion detection and access control; limited use of smart card technology; and no identity management.

8. An independent assessment was conducted of the technical soundness and cost-effectiveness of the proposed access control system. The assessment reviewed

the proposals with regard to the objectives of the headquarters minimum operating security standards and concluded that the proposed security improvements were fully compliant with those standards; the level of technology specified was appropriate and there was no overspecification of requirements; the overall design approach and the selection of technologies, systems and brands were consistent with standard practice in the security industry; and the cost estimates and unit costs of the access control system were accurate for budgetary purposes.

III. Expected results of access control

9. While significant progress has been made in reaching the headquarters minimum operating security standards, challenges remain because of various physical features of the perimeters. The standardized access control initiative is designed to achieve compliance with the headquarters minimum standards with regard to perimeter protection and electronic access control. The project aims to address those specific deficiencies, leading to a precise and definite result. The proposal includes additional enhancements to security for compliance with the standards of physical security measures that focus on perimeter security; use of electronic access cards (smart card technology); use of CCTV systems; use of alarms and intrusion detection; and integrated central monitoring of access control systems.

10. In the interest of cost-efficiency and security effectiveness, the implementation of the access control system focuses on the entry points into and perimeter of premises. However, the flexibility of that core system allows for system expansion as the need arises where additional layers of protection may be identified as being necessary and the appropriate security hardware installed cost-effectively. Future security enhancements can therefore be implemented incrementally.

11. The scope of the proposal focuses on those devices, hardware, software and databases that constitute a single system. Each device (camera, card reader, intrusion detection or vehicle barrier) is connected, controlled and monitored via the network. The operational advantages of such an approach are significant, because security personnel will be able to monitor and take action at the system level, having a complete picture of security throughout the premises.

12. The level of implementation will vary for each duty station. The costs of complying with the headquarters minimum operating security standards and implementing a standardized access control and identity system were determined after a detailed process of security assessment and gap analysis for the premises of each duty station. The current proposal of $23,683,000 reflects the resources needed to raise each duty station from its current security level to a level of compliance with the headquarters standards as regards access control, without redundancy or waste of expenditure.

IV. Details and implications of the standardized access control project

A. Management

13. As explained in paragraph 11 of the report of the Secretary-General of 24 February 2006 (A/60/695) with regard to the implementation of physical security measures, the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Management

and administrative services at each main location share the respective responsibilities. Once projects have been completed and are operational, the offices away from headquarters, through the Department of Safety and Security, will manage the standardized access control system.

14. In paragraph 12 of the report, it was stated that an enhanced management structure, consisting of a senior-level steering group and the project access control team (see A/59/776) composed of security specialists and professionals with expertise in information technology and facility management would address the requirements of the site-specific plans at each main location.

15. In order to ensure that the project is fully tailored to specific conditions on the ground, including arrangements with host Governments, threat assessments and joint security arrangements at each location will be regularly updated in coordination with local law enforcement and security authorities. With the support of the project access control team, access control plans for each location are being verified in line with the standards of the Department of Security and Safety and care is being taken to ensure that those responsible for on-site procurement and implementation will receive the necessary technical security advice, guidance and assistance.

B. Integration with projects approved by the General Assembly in previous resolutions

16. The present report is submitted in the context of the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly from the fifty-sixth session onwards, focusing on the strengthening of the safety and security of United Nations operations, staff and premises. The proposed project is consistent with the strategy and objectives of those resolutions and is designed for full integration with fully implemented and pending projects. The standardized access control system presented in the report of the Secretary-General of 5 April 2004 (A/58/756) and approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 58/295 is an integral component of the collective strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations and will be fully integrated with the standardized access control project.

C. Integration with approved safety and security projects

17. Several resolutions and reports are relevant to the integration of access control: resolution 56/286, in which the General Assembly approved the Secretary-General's proposed long-term measures for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations premises; long-term measures related to the areas of security and safety of the premises/building and property management (A/56/848); resolution 58/295, on the revised estimates for the infrastructure projects of Phase I; and the significant enhancements to the minimum operating security standards as specified in the Secretary-General's report (A/58/756).

18. At the request of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (see A/60/7/Add.35), a synopsis of previously funded projects that would integrate seamlessly with the standardized access control system is provided in the following table:

Duty station	*Funded project*
United Nations Office at Geneva	• Creation of a security control centre with provision for adequate technical and communications support
	• Provision of full perimeter protection, including reinforcement of fences, traffic control barriers and access control at the Palais des Nations Gate and the Chemin de Fer Gate, modification of road access to the gates and installation of a new generalized video surveillance system
	• Improvement of the intermediate area surveillance, including lighting and video surveillance in the underground garage area
	• Installation of air and water intake protection structures
	• Upgrading of the public address system for emergency announcements
United Nations Office at Vienna	• Increase in threat-prevention measures, in particular along the site perimeter and service areas
	• Installation of perimeter fence surveillance and an alarm system
	• Constructional reinforcement of perimeter gates and posts, including vehicle crash barriers
	• Installation of remote closing and locking devices for building access
	• Installation of a vehicle recognition system and screening equipment for vehicle search
	• Installation of a stationary monitoring system for radioactive material
	• Installation of a heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system access control, protection and alarm system
	• Upgrading of the Security Control Centre
United Nations Office at Nairobi	• Establishment of a pre-registration area at the visitors' pavilion to screen delegates before allowing them into the complex
	• Additional improvement of gates and barriers and reinforcement of the perimeter fence
	• Construction of a registration booth for conference participants in the visitors' pavilion
	• Earth work and civil work for barriers, turnstiles and planter boxes around the entrance to the complex
	• Relocation and construction of new security booths
Economic Commission for Africa	• Enlargement of the visitors' entrance area, including the provision of a covered pavilion and access gates for the handicapped, and installation of a revolving turnstile
	• Construction of a small building for registration of conference participants outside the main entrance to improve access control

Duty station	*Funded project*
	• Construction of premises for an off-site pass, identification and accreditation centre
	• Improvements to physical security and reinforcement of the existing perimeter wall
	• Construction of a new perimeter security wall around the additional land granted by the host Government
	• Upgrading of the closed-circuit television system (CCTV) at the United Nations Conference Centre and installation of a CCTV perimeter intrusion detection system
	• Installation of a fire alarm notification system in the office buildings
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	• Upgrading of surveillance and preventive measures, including expansion of the existing video surveillance system to encompass the entire perimeter of the complex; modification of the fire sub-control centre to integrate all CCTV cameras and all motion detectors into the building automation system; and installation of infrared motion detectors around the entire perimeter of the complex and improvement of lighting in the garage
	• Installation of four hydraulic vehicle barriers at all major entrances and installation of 20 static bollards to prevent vehicle ramming at vulnerable perimeter locations
	• Installation of an automatic vehicle bomb scanning system at the main entrance
	• Installation of an intruder alarm system for all fire escape doors and access ways to the buildings
	• Upgrading of the CCTV system, including computerizing the control centre for improved monitoring and coverage
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	• Upgrading of the lighting, alarm and video surveillance systems
	• Construction of an off-site pass and identification centre at the southern entrance area of the Commission complex
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	• Upgrading of protective measures, including installation of a fence and sliding doors to provide protection from demonstrators and threats from the street, as well as intrusion from adjacent buildings; installation of video surveillance equipment in the garage and service lift and on the roof of the building to protect against intruders; and installation of lighting on the perimeter wall
	• Construction of a screening area

19. These previously funded initiatives as proposed by the Secretary-General (see A/58/756) represented urgent initial measures, but they have left gaps in compliance

with the headquarters minimum operating security standards. The goal of the present proposed standardized access control project is to fill those gaps. The end result is a compliant integrated perimeter protection and electronic access control system.

D. Integration with the overall United Nations information technology strategy

20. In paragraph 44 (a) of section XI of its resolution 59/276, the General Assembly mandated the integration of the standardized access control system with other projects approved by it in previous resolutions, including those being implemented in the context of the overall information technology strategy. Information technology security, disaster recovery, business continuity and crisis management are broader issues that, while outside the scope of the standardized access control project, may have an impact on the project by imposing new requirements for data links or technological applications. The Department of Safety and Security will therefore continue to maintain close coordination with the Information Technology Services Division of the Department of Management in order to ensure compliance of ongoing, intended or future access control and other security activities or systems with the overall United Nations information technology strategy. Integration with that evolving strategy in connection with reform initiatives will also be taken into consideration throughout the life cycle of the project. The project access control team project management structure, consisting of multiple service areas to include information technology offices, will ensure that the necessary service-level interfaces are incorporated into all access control systems.

E. Impact on human resource requirements

21. In paragraph 44 (b) of section XI of its resolution 59/276, the General Assembly requested an assessment of the impact of implementing the standardized access control system on human resource requirements in the area of safety and security. The impact of implementing the system on human resource requirements, specifically security officers, is negligible. Although the system is an information technology-based system, it is not an automation system replacing functions or reducing manpower requirements, but rather an essential capability-enhancing tool to security personnel serving as the "eyes and ears" of the perimeter.

22. With reference to the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of 28 October 2004 (A/59/539), the standardized access control project strategy is consistent with the Organization's commitment to make full use of technological achievements that could reduce dependence on human resources. The implementation of a robust access control capability is an example of that commitment. With the appropriate deployment of technology, security personnel are no longer subject to the challenge of being at the right place at the right time in the event of an incident. Instead, a well-integrated surveillance and intrusion detection system gives security officers an effective detection and response capability.

23. The implementation of a standardized access control system does require a small cadre of specialized and dedicated staff. The human resource requirement is

necessary to meet the requirements of sustained operations and maintenance round the clock. The access control system is a mission-critical system serving as a backbone to the physical protection capability of the premises. It requires a fail-safe operation round the clock. To that end, the need for specialized technical support is anticipated, which will be fully analysed and included in the scope of review for the second phase of the standardized access control project.

F. Individual characteristics of each United Nations headquarters and main duty station

24. In formulating proposals for the access control system, global standards have been adopted for technologies, equipment and design to leverage economies of scale, bring down maintenance costs, improve maintenance and build a common pool of skills. However, the estimates also reflect the diversity among the environments of the duty stations and their differing requirements. The proposals are thus not generic, but tailored to the specific requirements of each duty station to ensure compliance with the common minimum standards prescribed by the headquarters minimum operating security standards, using a standard technological framework.

25. The basis for the proposal is that the unique requirements for each duty station campus, taking into account existing investment, the campus environment, gap analysis and localized costs such as labour, were assessed for each campus and costed accordingly. Current compliance with the headquarters minimum operating security standards for perimeter protection and electronic access control varies for each duty station based on two factors: (a) the unique nature of the campus; and (b) previous investment in physical security. The proposal accounts for these two factors in addressing the requirements of each campus with respect to existing implementation. The most noteworthy difference among campuses will be the equipment and installation requirements for the physical layout of the campus. A survey of the individual characteristics of each United Nations headquarters and main duty stations is presented in paragraphs 26-55.

G. Economic Commission for Africa

26. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) complex in Addis Ababa consists of seven buildings spread over an area of 27.3 acres. Apart from the offices of the Economic Commission for Africa, the complex accommodates the offices of 14 other United Nations entities.

27. The duty station does not use electronic identity (ID) cards and is therefore not equipped with card reader devices, access control software or electronically controlled hydraulic barriers. The campus currently has 122 CCTV cameras installed, but they are backed up to video home system (VHS) tape recorders and proprietary video recorders. CCTV is not integrated with an access control system. Additional cameras are proposed to cover areas of the perimeter and sensitive locations that are not provided for under the existing installation. Previously installed cameras will be fully integrated with the proposed access control system.

28. The proposal is based on the installation of card reader devices on perimeter doors, hydraulic vehicle barriers, badging stations, cameras, lighting to support the

perimeter, access control software and a redesigned security control room with system integration and monitoring.

H. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

29. The main premises of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago currently have very limited access control systems in place. The duty station does not use electronic ID cards or hydraulic vehicle barriers and its perimeter of 14.18 acres is not equipped with intrusion detection and alarm systems. The CCTV system consists of 32 cameras, which do not adequately cover the perimeter and are not integrated with a security control centre. CCTV video is backed up via tapes. The perimeter lighting was upgraded during the biennium 2002-2003 but remains insufficient. The power back-up capacity, however, is adequate.

30. The proposal is based on the installation of card reader devices on perimeter doors, hydraulic vehicle barriers, badge-making stations, additional cameras, lighting to support the perimeter, access control software and a redesigned security control centre with system integration and monitoring for the main ECLAC premises in Santiago. Regional centres will be considered in the second phase of the standardized access control project.

I. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

31. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) complex consists of three buildings, including a conference centre, occupying an area of 7.8 acres near to several government offices. The duty station does not use electronic ID cards and is therefore not equipped with card reader devices, access control software or electronically controlled hydraulic barriers. The location currently has CCTV installed; however, it is recorded on VHS tape recorders and proprietary video recorders. CCTV is not integrated with any access control system. Additional cameras are proposed to cover areas of the perimeter and sensitive locations that are not provided for under the existing installation. Previously installed cameras will be fully integrated with the proposed access control system.

32. The proposal is based on the installation of card reader devices on perimeter doors, card badging stations, cameras, access control software and a redesigned security control centre with system integration and monitoring.

J. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

33. The United Nations House/Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Building is located in the Central District of Beirut and is one of the main buildings in Riad el-Solh Square. The total area of the compound amounts to 10.7 acres. The duty station uses electronic ID cards and is therefore equipped with some card reader devices, access control software and two electronically controlled hydraulic vehicle barriers. The access control software is an old version in need of an upgrade. The location currently has 73 CCTV cameras installed; however, they are backed up to a single proprietary video recorder that is not integrated with the access control system. Additional cameras are proposed to cover areas of the perimeter and sensitive locations that are not provided for under the existing

installation. Previously installed cameras will be fully integrated with the proposed access control system.

34. The proposal is based on the installation of hydraulic vehicle barriers, card reader devices, card badging stations, cameras, access control software and limited redesign of a security control centre with integration and monitoring.

K. New York: annex buildings

35. The United Nations Headquarters premises in New York consist of the United Nations Secretariat and 12 annex buildings, all in close proximity. The annex buildings account for an area of approximately 20 acres. In many cases, security for the annex buildings is provided by the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services of the Secretariat during business hours and by the landlord after business hours.

36. The scope of the proposal is to secure the points of ingress into and egress from the annex buildings by the migration of the existing security systems to the United Nations global standard for access control and video. A broad approach was taken to include the specific electronic security needs of the various occupants and the workplace environment in each of the locations. The first phase of project implementation will cover the three annex buildings mentioned below as they have the greatest gap between existing conditions and the headquarters minimum operating security standards.

37. Recommendations for security monitoring and controls take into account that the United Nations is, in most cases, one of many tenants in a building that is owned and operated by an unrelated landlord.

1. Falchi Building

38. The Falchi Building in Long Island City, New York, is geographically removed from Headquarters and has no identification on the facade of the building to indicate to the general public that it houses United Nations premises. Security for the building is provided by the landlord. The United Nations occupies two floors of the warehouse building and the space is used as file storage for the Secretariat. The scope of the proposal is to secure ingress and egress points and to migrate the existing system to United Nations global standards for access control and video.

39. The proposal is based on the provision of security devices as follows: cameras, door contacts, request-to-exit motion detectors, card readers, electromagnetic locks and integration with the Headquarters access control system.

2. FF Building on East 45th Street

40. The FF Building is very close to the Headquarters premises, but is not identified on the outside as United Nations premises. Security for the building is provided in the lobby by United Nations security personnel during normal business hours and by the landlord after hours. There is coverage around the clock.

41. The FF Building is split between three occupants: the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Development Programme, which between them occupy 95 per cent of the building, and a third-party magazine not affiliated with the United Nations.

42. The proposal is based on the provision of security devices for both the tenant and landlord space as follows: turnstiles, magnometers, cameras, door contacts, door releases, request-to-exit motion detectors, card readers, electromagnetic locks and integration with the Headquarters access control system.

3. UNITAR Building

43. The UNITAR Building is very close to the Headquarters premises and is identified on the outside for the general public as "The United Nations Institute for Training and Research". Security for the building is provided in the lobby by United Nations security personnel during normal business hours only.

44. The Secretariat occupies the entire UNITAR Building. The second to fifth floors are general office spaces, while the first floor is the United Nations badge-making area, which houses documentation and passes for access onto Headquarters premises and is protected only by glass windows and camera.

45. The proposal is based on the provision for security devices as follows: cameras, door contacts, door releases, request-to-exit motion detectors, card readers and integration with the Headquarters access control system.

L. United Nations Office at Geneva

46. The costs estimated for the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) pertain to the Palais des Nations and the Palais Wilson. The security requirements for standardized access control for the new G. Motta Building for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights were described in the Secretary-General's report (A/60/899) and were approved by the General Assembly in its decision 60/562. The costs estimated do not include the annex buildings serviced by the UNOG Security and Safety Section and occupied by organizations funded from extrabudgetary resources. The plan layout of the two sites is as follows: the Palais des Nations has a total area of 111.20 acres, a perimeter of 10,498 feet, with 16 occupied buildings and 3 storage buildings; the Palais Wilson has a building area of 2.42 acres. The duty station does not use electronic ID cards for entry to the premises and is therefore not equipped with card reader devices or access control software in these locations. There are six electronically controlled hydraulic vehicle barriers in place for some of the entrances.

47. The uniqueness of the UNOG premises has a significant impact on the resources required for the access control project. The land is not flat and the perimeter is encircled with large trees and thick foliage. Added to this is the large distance between the perimeter and the buildings. Currently there are 92 camera positions located at the gates and at limited areas in the Palais des Nations. The existing cameras are not integrated with any access control system.

48. The high number of cameras required includes full perimeter coverage as well as coverage of the intermediate areas (which are wooded and therefore require more cameras to achieve line of sight for a given area). All 49 entry points into the building, as well as six other buildings within the UNOG premises, will also have camera surveillance. Added to this are the multiple locations of high security areas that need to be monitored (e.g. executive offices of the organizations inside the Palais des Nations, power stations, server rooms, archives, museum and so on). The entry points, secure areas and conference areas will also require differing levels of access control, hence the need for a substantial number of card readers and

turnstiles. The gross requirement has been significantly reduced after taking into account the approved projects related to perimeter protection and surveillance of intermediate areas.

49. The proposal is based on the installation of card reader devices, card badging stations, cameras and access control software and a redesigned security control centre with system integration, and monitoring with digital backbone to provide connectivity for the system.

M. United Nations Office at Nairobi

50. The United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON) complex consists of an area of 163 acres; the length of the perimeter is 13,451 feet. There are 37 buildings, comprising a total office and conference centre space of 10 acres. The duty station does not use electronic ID cards and is therefore not equipped with card reader devices, access control software or electronically controlled hydraulic barriers.

51. The proposal is based on the installation of cameras, lighting, card reader devices, turnstiles, hydraulic vehicle barriers, card badging stations, access control software and a redesigned security control centre with system integration and monitoring.

N. United Nations Office at Vienna

52. The Vienna International Centre is the property of the Government of Austria and is leased by the United Nations. It occupies a total land area of 44 acres. The duty station uses electronic ID cards for entry to the premises but is not equipped with adequate card reader devices or access control software; the system is to be fully implemented under the first phase. There are 13 barriers installed, but they are not integrated with an access control system. The premises currently have a CCTV installation, but it does not cover the perimeter area and is not integrated with an access control system. The addition of 24 cameras is proposed to cover areas of the perimeter. Previously installed cameras will be fully integrated with the proposed access control system.

53. The proposal is based on the installation of cameras, card reader devices, card badging stations, access control software and a redesigned security control centre with system integration and monitoring.

O. Implications for the capital master plan

54. In paragraph 44 (d) of section XI of its resolution 59/276, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on the implications of the global access control system for the capital master plan. It should be recalled that, by its resolution 56/286, the Assembly moved forward from the capital master plan the implementation of a complex-wide access control project at Headquarters, as proposed by the Secretary-General (see A/56/848, annex I, para. 40 (b) (ii), and annex II). The related measures included the reinforcement of perimeter protection and the installation of surveillance, monitoring and preventive measures linked to a security command centre. That project has been largely implemented. Given that the physical security requirements of the main Secretariat complex are fully addressed through the capital master plan project, the proposed standardized access control

project in the case of Headquarters applies to only three Headquarters annex buildings. In that connection it should be noted that the capital master plan-managed project at the main Secretariat complex has been designed for full compatibility with the standardized access control project discussed in the present report.

P. Management of identity information

55. Although the global identity management component will be deferred for further analysis, the need for proper management of local identity repositories is vital. Local identity management systems will be governed by a strict policy and procedural framework aimed at ensuring due diligence and appropriate protection of sensitive data. A management and policy framework is clearly established for the principles and guidelines for sharing the information obtained through the system. The report of the Secretary-General on an information and communications technology strategy (A/57/620) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on the use of information and communications technology resources and data (ST/SGB/2004/15) make specific provisions for the security of the system and the safeguarding of sensitive information. The strategy applies basic staff rules for the sharing of access control and identity-related information ensuring that the access to or possession or distribution of sensitive data is in accordance with all regulations, rules and administrative issuances applicable to such sensitive data.

56. The policy further establishes the norms for safeguarding and accountability of staff for preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information and forbids making sensitive information and communications technology data available to persons who have not been authorized to access the data.

57. Access to identity information, in particular records relating to entering into and exiting from the facility, are deemed "confidential" and "vital", and are therefore limited in dissemination. Access will be on a formally certified need-to-know basis or on the basis of an emergency requirement. For the purpose of emergency preparedness and recovery operations, the system will record entry and exit of persons. This requirement is now common practice as a result of the events of 11 September 2001 at the World Trade Centre. It is critical, in emergencies, for the Organization to be able to establish the presence or absence of persons on the premises. The information is recorded for this sole purpose.

58. The concern for privacy has not been neglected, is preserved and will be enforced by policy. It is important to note that the types of information shared through the system, as mentioned, will be strictly identity data (e.g. name, duty station, access level and so on) and not records relating to the movement of the named person. Access control records relating to entry, exit and movement within the premises are not shared except in the event of an emergency.

59. In the interest of transparency and accountability, the Secretariat is committed to make the architecture, database and associated procedures protected and secured from sharing of identity data. This includes the enforcement of specialized policies for data relating to delegates. As stated in the Secretary-General's bulletin of 29 November 2004 (ST/SGB/2004/15), the Office of Internal Oversight Services is empowered to review and when necessary conduct investigations into the use, sharing and accessing of identity data and processes.

V. Financing and time frame for implementation of the project

60. As mentioned above, it is foreseen that the implementation of the standardized access control project will be undertaken in two phases. During the first phase it is intended to rectify all the shortcomings and gaps in physical security identified during the project reassessment process undertaken in 2005. Those requirements are described in summary form in the table below, by duty station and function or project. All items listed are to be implemented during the first phase, noting that, in line with ongoing security changes in duty stations, a redistribution of individual amounts within duty stations may be necessary. The related costs are estimated at $23,683,000, as proposed in the previous report of the Secretary-General (A/60/695), for which authorization is sought in order for the Secretary-General to enter into commitments to be reported in the context of the relevant second performance reports for the tribunals and the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

Estimated resource requirements for the first phase of the project, by duty station and function or project

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Duty station	*Perimeter intrusion*	*Closed-circuit television*	*Access control barriers*	*Identification server and badging stations*	*Security control room*	*Total*
Geneva	150.0	150.0	—	675.0	946.6	1 921.6
Vienna	210.0	100.0	176.6	525.0	1 100.0	2 111.6[a]
Nairobi	—	1 862.9	2 200.0	425.0	600.0	5 087.9
Addis Ababa	439.4	650.0	950.0	425.0	1 150.0	3 614.4[b]
Santiago	750.0	800.0	577.5	425.0	600.0	3 152.5
Bangkok	—	245.0	—	375.0	325.0	945.0
Beirut	100.0	325.0	1 250.0	375.0	125.0	2 175.0
New York annex buildings	—	—	—	—	—	1 200.0[c]
Subtotal	**1 649.4**	**4 132.9**	**5 154.1**	**3 225.0**	**4 846.6**	**20 208.0**
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia	100.0	—	950.0	325.0	125.0	1 500.0
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	550.0	—	950.0	400.0	75.0	1 975.0
Subtotal	**650.0**	**—**	**1 900.0**	**725.0**	**200.0**	**3 475.0**
Total	**2 299.4**	**4 132.9**	**7 054.1**	**3 950.0**	**5 046.6**	**23 683.0**

[a] $2,111,600 is the gross provision for Vienna. Under the regular budget, the portion of cost attributable to the United Nations under the cost-sharing arrangements is $458,428.

[b] In addition, estimated requirements in the amount of $417,300 for the access control system to be installed in the new office building at the Economic Commission for Africa (see A/60/532, para. 19) would be needed at a later stage.

[c] Urgent security measures for the UNITAR, FF and Falchi Buildings.

61. Subject to approval by the General Assembly of the proposed concept, scope and revised course of action for the project as reflected in the present report, during the first phase of project implementation it is also foreseen that the project will be fully developed on a site-by-site basis and that a detailed project implementation plan for the second phase will be submitted to the Assembly at its sixty-second session. Projects during the second phase would complete the security access control strategy by closing all headquarters minimum operating security standards access control gaps. Components of the second phase are directed at the inner circles of protection, which include but are not limited to building doors, windows and roofs, conference and meeting rooms, critical infrastructure rooms, elevator cars and lobby controls, highly secure offices, archival and special storage areas and parking garages. Access control devices would include but not be limited to CCTV, optical portals, revolving doors, door alarms, intrusion detection, emergency intercoms and panic alarms. All devices would be fully integrated into the existing central monitoring control centres. The second phase would also include closing the headquarters minimum operating security standards gap for all annex buildings at Headquarters, to be carried out on a cost-shared basis with the United Nations funds and programmes that are tenants of the buildings, the full project cost estimates and financing arrangements. Similarly for the United Nations Office at Vienna, the two phases of standard access control will be carried out on a cost-shared basis with the other United Nations entities housed in the complex.

62. The second phase of project implementation would begin only after consideration of and approval by the General Assembly of the project proposals to be submitted to it at its sixty-second session. Detailed cost estimates for the second phase cannot be made until the elements of the first phase have begun. It is estimated that the completion time of the entire project will be between 24 and 30 months, to include a design phase of 6 to 8 months and an implementation phase of 18 to 24 months from the date of approval by the Assembly of the implementation plan and relevant financing arrangements.

VI. Conclusions

63. **Following the review and assessment of the current status of access control at all main locations of the Organization, a two-part approach for implementation of the standardized access control system is proposed. In the first phase, measures will be taken to rectify identified shortcomings and gaps in perimeter protection and electronic access control at all main locations. The total related estimated requirement of $23,683,000 is proposed to be met by commitment authority to be reported in the context of the second performance reports for the tribunals and the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.**

64. **The second phase of the standardized access control project will achieve full access control compliance with the headquarters minimum operating security standards. Specifically, the second phase of standardized access control is designed to provide a full package of access control measures of protection beyond the perimeter layer and into the multiple internal layers of protection. This would include but not be limited to building doors, windows and roofs, conference and meeting rooms, critical infrastructure rooms, elevator cars and lobby controls, highly secure offices, archival and special storage areas and**

parking garages. Access control devices would include but not be limited to CCTV, optical portals, revolving doors, door alarms, intrusion detection, emergency intercoms and panic alarms. All devices would be fully integrated into the existing central monitoring control centres.

65. Included in the plan will be capacity for technical security advice and support, a defining of the scope and approach for standardization, a procurement strategy based on standardization of systems and equipment while allowing for serviceable local variations, advice and support for system maintenance and identification of the impact of the standardized access control system on human resource requirements in the area of safety and security.

VII. Action required by the General Assembly

66. The General Assembly is requested:

(a) To approve the proposed course of action;

(b) To authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments of $20,208,000 under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, $1,500,000 under the budget for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and $1,975,000 under the budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to be reported on in the context of the respective second performance reports.

United Nations A/61/567

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Agenda item 151
Financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

Financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007 (A/61/519). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with the representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information.

2. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Security Council, in its resolution 1599 (2005), decided, inter alia, to establish the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) as a follow-on mission to the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET), which remained operational until 20 May 2006. Following the incidents of 28 and 29 April 2006, the Security Council, in its resolutions 1677 (2006), 1690 (2006) and 1703 (2006), extended the UNOTIL mandate until 20 June, 20 August and 25 August 2006, respectively. A multidisciplinary assessment mission was dispatched by the Secretary-General to Timor-Leste to develop recommendations on the future strengthened presence of the United Nations. In his report to the Security Council dated 8 August 2006 (S/2006/628), the Secretary-General indicated that, in conducting the assessment, the mission had consulted with a broad cross-section of Timorese and international stakeholders, international forces on the ground, representatives of international and regional bodies, donors and the diplomatic community; the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator was also involved in the process. This coordination made it possible to draw on the institutional knowledge gained by the Organization from the prior presence in Timor-Leste of the United Nations country team and UNOTIL, as well as the work done by international and bilateral partners. On this basis, the Secretary-General presented his recommendations on the future role of the

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United Nations in Timor-Leste and the establishment of a multidimensional, integrated mission in Timor-Leste in that report.

3. In its resolution 1704 (2006), the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for an initial period of six months, with the intention of renewing it for further periods; it also decided that the Mission would consist of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff officers. The Mission's mandate is set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1704 (2006).

4. In the report under consideration, the Secretary-General indicates that the full budget for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 will be submitted to the General Assembly at its resumed sixty-first session, in view of the recent establishment of the Mission and the time required for the preparation of the results-based budgeting frameworks and determination of the full requirements for the 2006/07 period, as well as for their legislative review (A/61/519, para. 3). In this connection, it was confirmed to the Advisory Committee that the full budget would not be available before mid-February 2007. Pending the submission of the full budget, the Secretary-General is therefore requesting that the Assembly grant commitment authority with assessment in the amount of $172.5 million to cover the immediate cash, human and operational requirements of UNMIT for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007, in accordance with the terms of resolution 49/233 A, section IV, paragraph 2 (A/61/519, para. 4). The proposed amount is inclusive of the commitment authority of $49,961,500 granted by the Advisory Committee on 8 September 2006 to meet the immediate and essential start-up requirements of the Mission.

5. As indicated above, however, the budget for the operation of the Mission for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 is to be presented to the Advisory Committee in February 2007 for submission to the General Assembly in March 2007 when the Mission will already have been in operation for almost eight months and just before its expected renewal by the Security Council (see para. 3 above). The proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 would be presented shortly thereafter for submission to the General Assembly in May 2007.

6. **The Advisory Committee is well aware that in recent years, for a variety of reasons, the General Assembly has approved commitment authority with assessment in connection with the financing of a number of peacekeeping operations; however, the Committee has pointed out in the past that this represents a departure from good budget practice and discipline (see A/58/809, para. 6). The Committee has also pointed out that commitment authority, by its nature, is decided upon on an urgent basis for the start-up of a new mission or the expansion of an existing one (see Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, regulation 4.6) when there is no time for the considered reasoning that goes into preparing a full programme budget and setting up an organizational structure. It has also cautioned the Secretariat not to present de facto budgets in connection with requests for commitment authority because the Committee should not be forced into a position in which it would, in essence, agree to a budget and all the decisions that go along with it without the necessary time and data for proper elaboration or consideration (A/60/870, para. 53).**

7. The Advisory Committee further recalls that the Secretary-General, in the reports leading to the adoption of resolution 49/233 A, which established the basis for the current commitment authority procedure, indicated that the "estimates for minimum funding required to procure equipment or services to begin the mission and to sustain it for three months could be regarded as the start-up costs" (see, for example A/48/945, para. 15). **Commitment authority should therefore constitute a short-term funding bridge mechanism pending the timely submission of fully detailed and justified budgets.**

8. **While the Advisory Committee has gone along with the assessed commitment authority procedure, the practice is becoming too routine. The Committee advocates a return to stricter adherence to proper budget procedure, whereby assessments are decided on the basis of a duly approved appropriation by the General Assembly after the consideration of a complete and fully justified budget submission.**

9. **In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, the foregoing is particularly relevant in the case of UNMIT. The Committee points out that the United Nations has been present in East Timor for over seven years and that it is thoroughly familiar with the situation, the relevant actors and local conditions; the United Nations Mission in East Timor was established in June 1999, followed by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor in October 1999, UNMISET in May 2002 and UNOTIL in May 2005. The Secretary-General should therefore have been in a position to present a full budget in a more timely fashion.**

10. **Although a request for commitment authority is not supposed to be presented as a budget, the Advisory Committee notes that a number of budgetary details have been provided. The Committee points out that these details have been provided without the accompanying justification. The General Assembly is thus being requested to take cognizance of a structure and related resources without the necessary supporting explanation and justification. Moreover, given that almost eight months of the Mission's mandate will have been completed before the budget can be approved by the Assembly (see para. 5 above), the basic structure and resource requirements will have been established de facto without specific approval by the Assembly.**

11. **In the meantime, and pending the submission of a budget in February 2007, the Advisory Committee sees no other option but to recommend that the mechanism of commitment authority with assessment be utilized in this case. This consideration takes into account the prevailing circumstances with regard to UNMIT, especially as the Secretary-General will not present a budget until February 2007 and that there is a need for additional funds. The Committee trusts that future recourse to this mechanism will be confined to the limited use for which it was envisaged. The Committee trusts further that in the future, on the basis of its considerable and growing experience with peacekeeping budgets, the Secretariat will apply the budget discipline required for the timely submission of proper budgets for the financing of peacekeeping operations.**

12. **In the paragraphs below, the Advisory Committee makes a series of observations and recommendations with regard to the levels of commitment authority and assessment for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007, as well as other matters. These should also be taken into account in the**

preparation of the budget submission for UNMIT for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007.

13. The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council provides information on the envisaged structure of the mission (S/2006/628, paras. 112-137). The Advisory Committee notes that the Security Council, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 1704 (2006), requested the Secretary-General to conclude a status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Timor-Leste within 30 days of the adoption of that resolution. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the agreement had been signed on 4 October 2006.

14. The Security Council has also requested the Secretary-General to review the arrangements to be established between UNMIT and the international security forces, having consulted all stakeholders, and to present his views no later than 25 October 2006, while further affirming that the Council will consider possible adjustments in the Mission structure, including the nature and size of the military component, taking into account those views (resolution 1704 (2006), para. 2). At the time of the Advisory Committee's consideration of the Secretary-General's request for commitment authority, the Security Council had not taken action in regard to the requested report. **An update, including with regard to possible adjustments, should therefore be given to the General Assembly.**

15. The Advisory Committee notes from the Secretary-General's report that the Mission's requirements for military and police personnel for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007 are estimated at $38,024,500. The proposed resources would cover the costs related to a total of 1,642 military and police personnel as follows: 34 military liaison and staff officers projected to be deployed in October 2006; 1,048 United Nations police officers scheduled to be deployed (an average strength of 845 police officers for the period); and four formed police units, each comprising 140 police personnel, of which two were deployed in August 2006, while one more was planned to be deployed by October and the other by November 2006. The requirements for mission subsistence allowance reflect a 10 per cent and 5 per cent deployment factor for military liaison and staff officers and United Nations police officers, respectively. Upon enquiry, the Committee was provided with a proposed schedule of personnel deployment (see annex I).

16. Estimated requirements of $25,587,600 are indicated under civilian personnel for costs related to a proposed provisional civilian staffing component of 1,935 (480 international staff, 1,075 national staff and 380 United Nations Volunteers) (A/61/519, section II.B.2.A). The Advisory Committee notes that this includes six posts (5 international and 1 national) related to the Resident Oversight Office (A/61/519, para. 11). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, based on actual incumbency, as at 31 August 2006, the total number of staff transferred from UNOTIL to UNMIT amounted to 334 (74 international staff, 225 national staff, including 19 National Officers, and 35 United Nations Volunteers). The Committee further notes that a delayed recruitment factor of 50 per cent has been applied to the costs for the additional international staff, and of 20 per cent in respect of the additional national staff and United Nations Volunteers.

17. **The Advisory Committee requests that the envisaged structure and staffing levels of the Mission, including the number and grade level of posts (particularly those at high levels) be carefully studied and justified in the budget submission, bearing in mind that missions of different dimensions, scope**

of activities and components have different requirements that would be reflected in structures specifically tailored to the needs of each mission.

18. The estimated requirements for operational costs amount to $108,916,500 (A/61/519, section II.A). The Advisory Committee notes that this includes resources of $2,052,200 under general temporary assistance. The resources are requested to cover 29 general temporary assistance positions, of which 22 are proposed to provide backstopping capacity at Headquarters in support of the deployment of UNMIT and 7 would integrate the Conduct and Discipline Team (A/61/519, paras. 5 and 27). Delayed recruitment factors of 40 per cent and 50 per cent have been applied to the international staffing costs at Headquarters and in UNMIT, respectively, while a 20 per cent factor is applied to the costs related to national staff positions of the Conduct and Discipline Team.

19. The 22 general temporary assistance positions requested in support of UNMIT at Headquarters are the following:

(a) Sixteen positions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

(i) Seven P-3 positions in the Logistics Support Division for a logistics officer, an aviation officer, a transport officer, a contingent-owned equipment and property management support officer, an information technology officer, an engineering officer and a supply officer;

(ii) Nine positions for the Administrative Support Division, comprising a P-5 position for a senior human resources officer, three P-3 positions for human resources officers and three General Service (Other level) positions for human resources assistants (Personnel Management and Support Service); and one P-3 finance officer and one General Service (Other level) position for a finance assistant (Finance Management and Support Service);

(b) Six positions in the Department of Management:

(i) Two P-3 positions for the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts for an accountant (Accounts Division) and a finance officer (Peacekeeping Financing Division);

(ii) Three positions for the Procurement Service for two procurement officers (P-4 and P-3) and one procurement assistant (General Service, Other level);

(iii) One General Service (Other level) position for a medical assistant (Medical Services Division).

20. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 30 September 2006, in the Department of Management, of the 34 and 29 support account posts approved for 2006/07 in the Peacekeeping Financing Division and the Accounts Division, respectively, two posts were vacant in each; of the 34 support account posts approved in the Procurement Division, three were vacant at the time. Likewise, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, of the 167 and 171 support account posts approved in the Administrative Support Division and Logistics Support Division, respectively, 10 posts were vacant in each. Moreover, support account resources of $3,968,000 and $7,802,300 had been appropriated for general temporary assistance in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Management, respectively, for the period 2006/07. As at 30 October 2006, their expenditures amounted to $298,373 and $679,377, respectively.

21. **The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the request for additional human resources at Headquarters should take into account the existing capacity of the support account, which was created to provide backstopping at Headquarters for peacekeeping operations. The Committee notes that existing vacancy rates and unutilized general temporary assistance resources in the support account allow an immediate response to additional needs. The Committee therefore recommends against the consideration of backstopping posts in the context of requirements for UNMIT. Instead, the need for additional backstopping capacity at Headquarters should be considered in the context of such requests as the Secretary-General may make under the support account, taking into account existing capacity and the vacancy situation.**

22. **The Advisory Committee recommends approval of the seven general temporary assistance positions proposed to integrate the Conduct and Discipline Team only (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-2, 1 Field Service, 1 National Officer and 1 General Service).**

23. The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed resources under operational costs also provide for the acquisition expenditures related to facilities and infrastructure ($18,305,000), vehicles and related equipment ($22,699,000), communications ($10,934,000) and information technology ($7,272,000). The Committee recalls that the Secretary-General provided information on the final disposition of assets of UNMISET (A/60/703). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that 4,717 items with a total value of $13,829,209 had been identified for transfer from UNOTIL to UNMIT.

24. The Advisory Committee requested information as to the funding provision made by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes present in Timor-Leste for 2006 and 2007 (see annex II). **The Committee notes that the funding provisions of several agencies have increased significantly for 2007 and recommends that the various existing areas of support provided to the Mission by the other country team partners and bilateral and multilateral partners be clearly identified in the context of the full budget submission.**

25. The proposed actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNMIT are contained in section IV of A/61/519. **The Advisory Committee recommends approval of the establishment of a special account for UNMIT as indicated in paragraph 41 (a) of that report. Taking into account its observations and recommendations in the paragraphs above, the Committee recommends that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the establishment and maintenance of the Mission for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007 in the amount of $170,221,100, inclusive of the amount of $49,961,500 previously authorized by the Committee. The Committee further recommends that the Assembly approve assessment, at this stage, of 50 per cent of the amount approved for commitment for the periods from 25 August 2006 to 25 February 2007 and from 26 February to 31 March 2007, subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission beyond 25 February 2007. The Secretary-General could request a further assessment should the need arise.**

26. **The Advisory Committee points out that care should be taken to avoid any implication that the provision of resources in response to the request for commitment authority in any way implies approval for the establishment of**

posts or the creation of new functions. The above recommendation for funding is therefore made without prejudice to any recommendations that it may make to the General Assembly when it considers the budget of UNMIT or any decision that the Assembly might take thereon with regard to budgetary and administrative matters, including but not limited to the administrative structure of the Mission, its staffing table and operational requirements.

Annex I

Proposed deployment of personnel, revised for United Nations police and formed police units (31 August 2006 to 31 March 2007)

	Scheduled deployment								
	31 August 2006	*30 September 2006*	*31 October 2006*	*30 November 2006*	*31 December 2006*	*31 January 2007*	*28 February 2007*	*31 March 2007*	*Average*
Military and police personnel									
Military observers	—	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	20
Military contingents	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
United Nations police	252	252	552	802	1 048	1 048	1 048	1 048	483
Formed police units	270	270	420	560	560	560	560	560	291
Total, military and police personnel	**522**	**556**	**1 006**	**1 396**	**1 642**	**1 642**	**1 642**	**1 642**	**794**
International staff	78	78	238	373	446	475	480	480	331
National Officers	3	3	26	50	61	62	62	62	41
National General Service staff	212	212	408	655	912	1 013	1 013	1 013	680
United Nations Volunteers	35	35	97	126	181	234	284	380	172
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total, civilian personnel	**328**	**328**	**769**	**1 204**	**1 600**	**1 784**	**1 839**	**1 935**	**1 223**

Annex II

Funding provisions made by the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes present in Timor-Leste*

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Agency	*2006*	*2007*
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2 000.0	4 000.0
International Labour Organization	3 100.0	4 100.0
International Organization for Migration	3 650.0	1 000.0
Department of Economic and Social Affairs	700.0	700.0
United Nations Development Programme	14 100.0	16 000.0
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization[a]	152.7	0.0
United Nations Population Fund	1 605.6	1 511.1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4 010.0	60.5
United Nations Children's Fund	11 944.0	8 544.0
United Nations Industrial Development Organization	0.0	1 250.0
United Nations Development Fund for Women	0.0	981.2
World Food Programme	9 000.0	14 000.0
World Health Organization	3 600.0	3 600.0
Total	**53 862.3**	**53 515.6**

[a] No resources are planned for 2007.

* Indicative and subject to change.

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Security Council
Sixty-first year

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Culture of peace

General and complete disarmament: confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Letter dated 2 November 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as a representative of the country coordinator of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Republic of Azerbaijan and Republic of Moldova), I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of States members of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM with regard to the adoption of Security Council resolution 1716 (2006) (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 11, 27, 44 and 90 (n), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Viktor **Kryzhanivskyi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

06-62242 (E) 211106

Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of States members of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM regarding the adoption of Security Council resolution 1716 (2006)

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM (ODED-GUAM) welcome the extension by the Security Council in its resolution 1716 (2006) of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia for a further period terminating on 15 April 2007.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of ODED-GUAM note with satisfaction the reaffirmation of the commitment of all members of the Security Council to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and the support of the Security Council for the principles contained in the "Paper on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi".

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of ODED-GUAM are pleased to note the interest of the Security Council regarding additional ideas of the sides with a view to conducting creatively and constructively a political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of ODED-GUAM welcome the efforts of the Government of Georgia to re-establish the rule of law, public order, stability and lawful conditions for the peaceful reintegration of the conflict zone into the political and economic systems of Georgia.

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Prevention of armed conflict

Culture of peace

General and complete disarmament: confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Letter dated 2 November 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as a representative of the country coordinator of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Republic of Azerbaijan and Republic of Moldova), I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the States members of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development — GUAM, issued at the meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, held in Minsk on 16 October 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 11, 44, Culture of peace and 90 (n).

(*Signed*) Viktor **Kryzhanivskyi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

06-62248 (E) 211106 211106

Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), member States of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development

The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development — GUAM welcomes the decision by Georgia to try to defuse the situation that has arisen in its bilateral relations with the Russian Federation by repatriating Russian servicemen detained in Georgia. Any inappropriate action by one of the States of the Commonwealth of Independent States against any other runs counter to the principle of mutual relations laid down in the fundamental instruments of the Commonwealth.

GUAM calls on States to refrain from unilateral acts directed at Georgia with a view to severing economic, humanitarian and other inter-State contacts.

GUAM expresses its conviction that the problems that have arisen, including those related to conflict settlement, should be resolved at the negotiating table, in accordance with the generally accepted standards and principles of international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental instruments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

GUAM welcomes the Russian Federation's undertaking to remove Russian military bases and military facilities of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus from the territory of Georgia during the course of 2008.

GUAM also welcomes Georgia's initiatives on settling the conflicts in its territory, particularly in proposals directed at extending the scope of negotiations and peacekeeping operations.

GUAM calls on other Commonwealth member States to support efforts aimed at overcoming the crisis in the relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia.

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Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Letter dated 10 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note verbale, dated 22 October 2006, addressed to the Embassy of Belgium in Tehran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 100, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Javad **Zarif**

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Annex to the letter dated 10 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

22 October

Note verbale

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran prese compliments to the Embassy of Belgium in Tehran and informs the latte according to the information received, the Belgian Senate has i Maryam Rajavi, one of the leaders of the terrorist group known as MK Belgium to address the Senate on 24 October 2006 and to attend some programmes.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the invitation extend Maryam Rajavi is in clear contradiction with the international obligatio Belgium to fight terrorism and contravenes the decision of the European U which has formally declared MKO as a terrorist group. The invitation is also a violation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), in which the Counc called for the commitment and cooperation of all States in the fight a terrorism.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its strong protest to the Gover and the Senate of Belgium in this regard, condemns the said invitation and upon the Government of Belgium to prevent Maryam Rajavi from enterin country and to cancel the invitation and all the programmes foreseen fo immediately.